Houthi Threat at Bab al-Mandab Raises Fresh Concerns Over India's Crude Oil Security

Houthi Threat to Bab al-Mandab: A New Chokepoint Risk for India's Oil Imports

Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthi militia has announced that it will target Saudi Arabian tankers transiting the Bab al-Mandab strait, and has already followed through with attacks on shipping. Two Saudi crude tankers headed to India and China have already turned back in the Red Sea after the Houthis threatened to block Saudi-linked shipping through the strait. The development widens the West Asia conflict's reach into India's crude oil supply chain, layering a second chokepoint risk on top of the ongoing disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.

"The diversions have renewed concerns over another major global oil chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz."

The Bab al-Mandab connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, making it — alongside Hormuz — one of the world's most consequential energy and trade corridors. Kpler data suggests around 6-7 million barrels per day of crude currently transits the strait, with roughly half being Saudi crude loaded from Yanbu and most of the remainder comprising Russian cargoes. The strategic significance of the route has grown further because Saudi Arabia had increasingly relied on it to export oil, including to India, precisely as Hormuz traffic dwindled through the year.

Immediate Fallout of a Blockade

Should the blockade take fuller effect, oil shipments bound for Asia would need to reroute westward via the Suez Canal and around the African coast, a diversion that could add weeks to transit time and push up freight and insurance costs. This carries real weight for India, which depends on imports for over 88% of its oil needs, since prolonged disruption could keep prices elevated even as industry voices describe the situation as concerning but still manageable rather than a full-blown crisis.

India's Cushion: Russian Crude

So far, Russian oil moving through the Suez–Red Sea corridor has stayed largely insulated from Houthi attacks, much as it did during earlier blockade episodes. Since this route is also the primary corridor through which Russian crude reaches Indian ports, a blockade confined to Saudi shipments — while Russian flows remain unaffected — would likely have a contained impact, with Russian volumes expected to rise further to offset any Saudi shortfall.

The scale of India's reliance on Russian oil underscores why this buffer matters so much. Russian crude imports climbed from around 1 million barrels per day in February to record highs of 2.6 million bpd by June, accounting for over half of India's total oil imports, with July tracking at similar levels; before the war, West Asia via Hormuz alone supplied over 40% of India's oil. Analysts believe Russian imports could potentially climb toward or beyond 3 million bpd if market conditions and Russian export capacity allow.

Other Buffers in Play

Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline running to Yanbu currently carries roughly 300,000–500,000 bpd and offers a partial cushion so long as Red Sea transit stays open. The UAE's Murban crude presents a more practical emergency option, since it can bypass both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab entirely by loading from Fujairah and reaching India within five to six days. American and South American crude remain theoretical alternatives at best, given voyage times too long to serve as emergency replacement barrels. India's increasingly diversified crude slate, now spanning dozens of suppliers, gives it more flexibility to absorb shocks than in earlier years of the conflict.

Tightening Discounts on Russian Barrels

The comfort of Russian supply comes at a rising price. Russian Urals crude, once available at a discount of around $7 a barrel to Dubai crude before the latest escalation, has seen that discount vanish entirely, with Indian refiners now competing for barrels at a premium. India's room to expand access further is also constrained, since China and Turkey are drawing on the same pool of Russian cargoes.

The Bigger Risk: Russia's Black Sea Exports

Experts increasingly flag that Russia's Black Sea export infrastructure, particularly the Novorossiysk terminal, may pose a more serious risk to India than the Red Sea situation itself. Unlike Red Sea cargoes, which can be rerouted around Africa, Black Sea alternatives are far more limited. The Sheskharis terminal at Novorossiysk halted operations after Ukrainian strikes, and this matters greatly for India — of the 1.1 million bpd loaded at the terminal in June, around 840,000 bpd went to India, meaning the Novorossiysk complex alone supplied roughly 28% of India's Russian crude imports that month. Satellite tracking suggests loadings paused from June 20, although some tankers appear to be switching off transponders to avoid detection; the port infrastructure itself is believed undamaged, and the disruption is expected to prove temporary.

Medium-Term Risk: A Recovering Russian Refinery Sector

Russia had, in the interim, actually increased its crude exports, as Ukrainian strikes forced several domestic refineries offline for repairs and freed up additional barrels for export, largely toward China and India. Russia's crude exports hit a record 4.5 million bpd in June, of which about 55% flowed to India. However, as the affected refineries come back online, Moscow is expected to prioritise its own domestic fuel requirements over exports, potentially trimming Russian crude exports by as much as 1 million bpd once the recovery is complete.

Conclusion

India's oil security today rests on a layered and somewhat delicately balanced set of risks rather than a single point of failure. A Houthi blockade at Bab al-Mandab threatens Saudi supplies directly, but the more consequential medium-term vulnerability may lie with Russia's Black Sea export infrastructure, given Russia's outsized and still-growing share of India's crude basket. India's increasingly diversified supplier base, along with flexible options such as UAE's Murban crude, provides meaningful cushioning for now but sustained disruption on either the Red Sea or Black Sea front would test the limits of that resilience, reaffirming that energy security in an era of overlapping geopolitical conflicts is less about avoiding any single chokepoint and more about managing simultaneous exposure across several.